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The global economy experienced a general slowdown in economic activity in the late 2000s 
that economists and business analysts consider as the worst economic crises experienced since 
World War II and the longest downturn since the 1930s Great Depression. Dubbed as the Great 
Recession (Wessel, 2010), worsening global economic conditions began in December 2007 as 
declared  by  the  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research  (NBER)  that  took  cues  from  the 
deteriorating conditions in the labor market (Isidore, 2009).   
The U.S. economy was not spared from the global crises, with the period of the late 2000s 
being marked by trends of high unemployment, declining real estate values, bankruptcies and 
foreclosures,  among  many  other  indicators  (Rutenber  and  Thee-Brenan,  2011).  A  widely 
accepted theory of the real culprit that significantly launched the onset of the economic crises in 
the United States was the breakdown of the real estate industry (Isidore, 2009).  The housing 
downturn started in 2006 when housing process dropped significantly after reaching peak levels 
in the early 2000s. This resulted in an abrupt increase in loan defaults and mortgage foreclosures 
that led to widespread crises in the banking industry. 
The late-2000s financial crisis led to a surge of bank failures in the United States at an 
overwhelming rate not observed in many years. The cycle of seizures started in 2007, and by the 
end of 2010, a total of 325 banks had failed. In contrast, only 24 banks had failed in the seven-
year period prior to 2007.  
In  times  of  economic  hardships,  there  is  often  less  confidence  in  the  resilience  and 
endurance of the agricultural sector in weathering business survival challenges since the farm 
sector is naturally too vulnerable to business and financial risks. Recalling the farm crises of the 1980s where the farm sector was pinpointed as one of the major precursors of economic turmoil
1, 
some experts suspect that significant loan exposures to agricultural activities could increase the 
probability of bank failure.  
In the face of the current recession that manifested itself in the financial industry, it is 
important to probe more deeply and understand the causes of bank failures, which should 
provide insights on more effective solutions to the current crises or  cautionary policies that will 
prevent its duplication in the future. Bank failures have been analyzed quite extensively in the 
corporate finance literature.  Many previous studies have examined the determinants of bank 
failures from previous episodes of financial crises by analyzing the nature and consequences of 
management decisions(Belongia and Gilbert,  1990), investigating the  effect of insider loans  
(Graham and Horner, 1988, Seballos and Thomson,1990, Belongia and Gilbert,1990, Thomson, 
1991) as well as overhead costs (Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2003, Seballos and Thomson, 1990, 
Thomson, 1991), analyzing the effect of product diversification or level of industry concentration 
on bank performance (Thomson 1991, and DeYoung and Hasan, 1998), and introducing different 
capital ratios as predictors of bank performance(Estrella, Park and Peristiani, 2000).  
This study differentiates itself from previous empirical works by its special focus on the role 
of the agricultural finance industry in t he ensuing credit crises. Specifically, this study  will 
determine the factors that significantly caused bank failures, with special attention given to the 
role of the agricultural lending portfolios of commercial banks . Moreover, it will determine the 
length of time prior to the actual bank bankruptcy declarations that early warning signals among 
the banks’ operating and lending decisions, in  addition to certain macroeconomic indicators, 
could be detected. 
                                                        
1 In 1980s, more than 1,600 banks closed due to the large amount of delinquent farm loans caused by farm operating losses and a 
fall in agricultural land values.  
 METHODOLOGY 
The basic framework of the models used in this study is based on traditional bank failure 
prediction models presented in the corporate finance literature.  Typically, the prediction model is 
a single equation model, with the primary goal of predicting bank failures. This study presents a 
variant of the typical model presented in literature differentiated through two model extensions: a) 
the addition  of state-level  variables that capture macroeconomic  factors, in  addition  to  bank 
performance variables; and b) the use of different time period versions of the cross-sectional 
model to determine earliest possible warning signals of bank failures.  
The  typical  single-equation  bank  failure  prediction  model  employs  logistic  regression 
techniques.  The logistic function is specified as: 
             
             
                  
 
       
   
           
    
 
The empirical design includes defining an equation for estimating         for each observation  
  that involves the following categories of explanatory variables: 
                 
                                                                    
                             
where         is the binary dependent variable that takes a value of 1 for banks classified by the 
FDIC as failed banks and zero for surviving or successful (non-failed) banks. The analyses in 
this  research  use  the  FDIC’s  criterion  that  equates  insolvency  with  failure.  Thus,  the  banks 
categorized as failed banks in this study are those considered by FDIC as severely insolvent or 
“critically  undercapitalized”
2.        are  variables  representing  capital  adequacy  and  asset 
quality;      is a set of management risk variables;      are variables that capture liquidity risk 
                                                        
2 When a bank’s risk-based capital ratio drops below 2%, it is classified by FDIC as “critically undercapitalized.” When this 
happens, FDIC declares the bank as insolvent and will take over management of the bank (FDIC, FDIC Law, Regulations, 
Related Acts). 
 and  bank  earnings  (profitability)  potential;       are  variables  that  represent  loan  portfolio 
composition  measures;        capture  loan  portfolio  risk  measures;        are  variables  that 
represent funding arrangements;        is a structural factor variable, specifically representing 
bank size;          are economic variables that capture macroeconomic conditions at the state 
level; t = t denotes the period of time prior to bank failure.   
In order to interpret the coefficients of the logit model, we need to estimate the marginal 
effect. The marginal effect for logit model is defined as 
  
   
      
             
       
The estimating model has six time period model versions.  Each time period model utilizes a 
cross-sectional dataset compiled at specific points in time away from the actual occurrence of 
bank failure.  The time period models considered in this study are explained in detail in Table 1. 
In the different time period models, PROB is the identifier for banks that eventually failed 
during the entire sample period.  For example, if Bank A is a bank that was declared bankrupt or 
insolvent in the 3
rd quarter of 2009 while Bank B went into bankruptcy in the 1
st quarter of 2009, 
and Bank C is a bank that successfully survived, the following delineation rules (table 1) are 
used in defining the observations for Banks A, B and C in the different cross-sectional time 
period models: 
This study will also analyze the robustness of the estimation results by employing in-sample 
and  out-of-sample  forecasting  methods.    Similar  to  the  in-sample  classification,  the  out-of-
sample forecasting uses the estimated coefficients from cross-sectional logistic regressions, but 
applies them to an expanded dataset. The failed sample consists of all banks that failed in 2010, 
which is a year after the reckoning year for the failed bank observations in the bank prediction or 
early warning signals models. Then, out-of-sample forecasting uses the estimated coefficients from  prediction  model  to  predict  the  outcomes  in  2010,  and  compare  them  with  the  actual 
outcomes  in  2010. Similar to  in-sample  accuracy, higher percentage of  correct  classification 
implies higher prediction efficiency. 
DATA MEASUREMENT 
In  order  to  determine  early  warning  signals  of  bank  failures  among  bank  performance 
variables, several cross-sectional datasets are compiled in this study.  The data for both failed 
banks and surviving banks are collected from the Call Reports Database published on the website 
of Federal Reserve Board of Chicago (FRB). The banking data are available through the banks’ 
quarterly financial statements made publicly available by the FRB.  This study’s banking data are 
collected on a quarterly basis from January 2005 to September 2010, a time period that captures 
the favorable economic times prior to the onset of the current recession and the aggravation of 
the bank bankruptcy filings in 2009 and 2010.  
For the non-failed sample, only banks that continuously reported their financial conditions in 
the dataset during the time period were included. Surviving or successful banks with missing 
values for any financial data being collected were discarded. Given these data restrictions, a total 
of 1109 banks were identified each year and included in the non-failed or successful bank sample.  
In compiling the dataset, special attention was given to those banks that failed in 2009 and 
2010 because these two years have the largest number of failure since 1992. FDIC records a total 
of 255 out of 297 failed banks to have been identified just in the two year period (2009-2010) – 
with 117 in 2009 and 138 in 2010.  
In addition to bank performance variables, this study also collected data from other sources 
that would reflect certain aspects of the local economic conditions during the recessionary period. 
These variables include state-level monthly unemployment rate data that were obtained from the Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  and  were  converted  to  quarterly  data.  State-level  numbers  of 
bankruptcy  were  collected  from  Bankruptcy  filing  statistics,  published  online  by  American 
Bankruptcy Institute (ABI). These bankruptcy figures were available for business, non-business 
and even sectoral (including agriculture-related filings under Chapter 12 bankruptcy) filings. The 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provided data on the state-level aggregation of personal 
incomes. 
Categories of Variables for Bank Failure Prediction Models 
In order to construct a model that can predict bank failure of all sizes, this study includes 
proxy variables based on balance-sheet and income data from Call Reports. RWCAPRATIO, the 
risk-weighted capital ratio, has been used as proxy for capital adequacy in CAMEL rating system. 
This variable is defined as the ratio of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, where tier 1 capital 
include common stock, common stock surplus, retained earnings, and some perpetual preferred 
stock(Estrella,  et  al.,  2000).  Another  variable  considered  in  this  category  is  LOANHER, 
measured as the loan portfolio diversification index
3.  
OVERHEAD and INSIDELN are proxies for management risk in  the  CAMEL rating 
systems. OVERHEAD is a measure of operating efficiency that was introduced in the model in a 
ratio form (dividing overhead costs by total assets). Using “Aggregate amount of all extensions 
of credit to executive officers, directors, and principal shareholders” as a proxy for the insider 
loan, we use the ratio of insider loan to total assets (INSIDELN) to capture another form of 
management risk: fraud or insider abuse.  
                                                        
3 The index was developed using the Herfindahl measurement method where the index was constructed from taking the sum of 
squares of various components of the loan portfolio: 
             
                 
           
 
 
   
                                
           
 
 
   
                




                               
           
 
 
   
                  





4, or return on assets, is the proxy for the banks’ earnings capability in the CAMEL 
rating system. Two types of liquidity measures were added to the model as proxies for liquidity 
risk.  LIQM1  was  calculated  by  dividing  non-deposit  liabilities  with  cash  and  investment 
securities. LIQM2 was calculated by dividing total loans with total deposits.  
Measures that capture the banks’ loan exposure to different industry sectors are also included 
in the analyses.  AGTOTAL, CONSTOTAL, INDUSTOTAL and RETOTAL are ratios of loans 
extended to the agricultural, consumer, industrial and real estate industries, respectively.  Beyond 
the previous category of loan portfolio-based variables, this study also considers loan portfolio 
risk measures that are expected to even shed more light into the causes of bank failures. In this 
study,  the  loan  delinquency  rates  that  capture  loan  portfolio  risk  are  measured  for  certain 
categories of loan exposures:  agricultural non-real estate loans (AGNR), agricultural real estate 
loans (AGR), commercial & industrial loans (INDUS), and consumer loans (CONSUM). The 
delinquency rates for the agricultural loan portfolio were separated for real estate and non-real 
estate loans in  order to isolate the effects  of real  estate loan  exposures  to  this industry and 
determine  whether  the  agricultural  sector  contributed  to  the  popular  claim  that  real  estate 
delinquencies, in general, are being suspected as the significant precursors of recession. 
The  next  three  early  warning  system  variables  represent  the  funding  arrangements  or 
strategies employed by banks. PURCHASEDTL, purchased liabilities as a percentage of total 
liabilities, is used to reflect the share of liabilities purchased from national market, as suggested 
by Belongia and Gilbert(Belongia and Gilbert, 1990). DEPLIAB, was calculated by taking the 
ratio of total deposits to total liabilities.  
                                                        
4 To calculate return on assets, we need to construct the net income after taxes to total assets ratio. The item net income after 
taxes are no longer available in Call Report, and item “Undivided profits and capital reserves” was used instead.  
 This study also considers duration gap, GAP, which is a commonly used tool to measure 
interest-rate risk. This study uses the definition given by Blasko and Sinkey.
5  Just as in their 
study, in this study, GAP is defined as the difference between rate -sensitive assets and rate-
sensitive liabilities(Blasko and Sinkey, 2006). This  approach is more appropriate to calculate 
GAP when using the Call Reports dataset since all the variables they used can be directly found 
from the dataset. 
SIZE variable was included in the model by taking the natural logarithm of total assets. This 
variable was added to the failure prediction model to account for the “too big to fail” doctrine.   
This study further extends the previous bank failure prediction (early warning) models by 
considering variables that capture the macroeconomic conditions at the state level.  UNEMRATE, 
is the quarterly percentage change of state-level unemployment rate. The data of U.S. bankruptcy 
filings was also used as a proxy for general business conditions of each state. BF, was calculated 
by aggregating each state’s business filings and non-business filings together, and dividing the 
total by the number of total filings of all states.  
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Bank Failure Prediction Model 
In  determining  early  warning  signals  for  predicting  bank  failures,  logistic  regression 
techniques were applied to several time period models dating back from 6 months to 48 months 
before a bank is declared insolvent by the FDIC, which is otherwise known in this study as bank 
                                                        
5 In their study, Blasko and Sinkey (2006) define rate sensitive assets = (Federal funds sold) + (Securities purchased 
under agreements to resell) + (Customer’s liability) + (Trading assets) + (Fixed and floating debt securities maturing 
or repricing within 12 months) + (Fixed and floating loans maturing or repricing within 12 months); rate sensitive 
liabilities = (Federal funds purchased) + (Securities sold under agreements to repurchase) + (Bank’s liability on 
acceptances executed and outstanding) + (Trading liabilities) + (Other borrowed money) + (Demand notes issued to 
the U.S. Treasury) + (Time and saving deposits) – (Large long-term time deposits).  
And GAP = rate sensitive assets – rate sensitive liabilities + (Small longer-term deposits).  failure.    This  portion  of  the  analysis  considers  6  time  period  cross-sectional  data  models
6:  
6months, 12 months, 18months, 24 months, 36 months, and 48 mo nths prior to failure. The in-
sample prediction for these 6 model versions is undertaken using a database of 95 banks that 
failed in 2009 and 1,180 banks that have survived and continued operations through that year. 
Table 2 summarizes the logistic regression results for all time period model versions, which 
are useful for determining the relative significance of variables and their directional (positive or 
negative) relationship with the dependent variable.  Table 3 provides the results for marginal 
effects that show the magnitude of influence the explanatory variables have on the  dependent 
variable.   
Based  on  the  result  summaries,  one  of  the  notable  results  was  the  significance  of 
RWCAPRATIO, the risk-weighted capital ratio, which is being used by the FDIC  to identify 
banks that are still solvent, those that need to be warned about possible insolvency, and those that 
are eventually closed down because of critically insolvent conditions . This ratio determines the 
capacity of the bank in terms of facing certain risks such as credit risk, and operational risk. This 
study’s results indicate that RWCAPRATIO is a significant negative determinant (and predictor) 
of bank failure from 6 months until as long as 18 months prior to failure.  The coefficients of this 
variable tend to become insignificant at longer time lags, which may suggest of its reliability as a 
predictor of financial stress over the short-run, but not over longer time horizons.  
The  LOANHER  measured  using  the  Herfindahl  index  approach  was  also  included  in 
Thomson’s study and did not fare well as in his regression models. In this study, this variable is 
also barely significant in the 6-month model as its p-value shows significance under the 10 
percent  confidence  level.  The  loan  portfolio  diversification  is  normally  regarded  as  a  risk-
                                                        
6 The heteroskedasticity was checked for each cross-sectional model with computing a likelihood ratio test between 
probit model (prob) and Heteroskedastic probit model (hetprob) in Stata. The results indicate the heteroskedasticity 
problem is not severe in our datasets. reducing  strategy  and,  thus,  the  significant  positive  coefficient  result  in  the  6-month  model 
suggests that diversification indeed helps minimize the probability of bank failure.  
Pursuant to the verified effectiveness of the loan portfolio diversification strategy, the loan 
portfolio  composition  variables  identify  the  sectors  that  banks  should  consider  in  their  loan 
servicing operations.  The regression results indicate that banks may consider loan exposures to 
their consumer credit clientele (CONSTOTAL) from 1 to 2 years prior to bank failures.  Loan 
exposures  to  agricultural  (AGTOTAL)  and  industrial  (INDUSTOTAL)  may  be  considered 
around 1 year before the onset of bank failures.  These variables are negatively signed, which 
suggests that an increase in the portfolio of these loans will decrease the probability of failure. 
Among the portfolio risk variables (AGNR, AGR, CONSUM and INDUS, which are loan 
ratios of past due/ nonaccrual loans), the most notable result that applies to this study’s special 
focus  is  the  insignificance  of  both  the  non-real  estate  and  real  estate  delinquency  ratios  for 
agricultural  loans  (AGNR  and  AGR)  across  all  time  period  models.  This  suggests  that 
agricultural loan ratios cannot be used as indicators for predicting bank failure. This finding is 
important  because  it  confirms  our  contention  that  exposure  to  clients  engaged  in  seemingly 
riskier and more uncertain agribusiness operations does not really pose as a risk or enhances a 
bank’s tendency to fail.  
On  the  contrary,  the  delinquency  loan  ratios  for  consumer  loans  (CONSUM)  and 
commercial/industrial  loans (INDUS) are significant  positive regressors in  some time period 
models.  CONSUM is a significant determinant or predictor of bank failure from 6 months up to 
18 months prior to bank failure, while INDUS is a significant bank failure predictor around 12 
and 24 months before bank insolvency.  The marginal effects results for these variables provide interesting insights and implications 
(Table  3).  A  1  percent  increase  in  the  industrial  loan  delinquency  ratio  will  increase  the 
probability of bank failure by 253% around 24 months before bank failure. At about a year 
before bank failure, the marginal effect of INDUS is 1.81.  The magnitude of the marginal effects 
for CONSUM is even larger.  In fact, the CONSUM has among the largest marginal effects as a 1% 
increase in the consumer loan delinquency ratio could increase the probability of bank failure by 
227%, 397% and 388% around 6, 12, and 18 months, respectively, before the occurrence of bank 
failure.  It is worth noting that most consumer loans extended by commercial banks are through 
credit cards and other revolving credit plans.  
Variables  that  capture  management  risk  and  insider  abuse  are  expected  to  be  positively 
related to the probability of bank failure. However, in contrast to the results obtained in previous 
studies, the coefficients of insider loan (INSIDELN) have remained consistently insignificant 
across all the time period models. On the other hand, the overhead cost ratio (OVERHEAD) 
variable has turned up negative and significant results in almost all time period models (except 
for  the  6  month  and  18  month  models).  This  contrasting  result  can  be  attributed  to  some 
plausible strategic moves of banks during the recessionary period. When faced with financial 
difficulty, especially illiquid conditions, banks may have the tendency to resolve the operating 
constraint by selling low-risk assets  (like Treasury securities) that are relatively more easily 
marketable.    As  a  result  of  such  probable  coping  mechanism,  the  bank  loses  its  asset  base 
(OVERHEAD ratio denominator) while at the same time, overhead costs (ratio’s numerator) 
could possibly be rising as a result of higher degrees of operating inefficiency produced by less 
prudent operating decisions.  Thus, the net effect of these two trends  would be the positive 
relationship between increasing OVERHEAD ratios and the probability of bank failure.  Two measures of liquidity (LIQM1, LIQM2) are included as regressors in the models to 
capture different facets of bank liquidity. LIQM1 captures liquidity that is attributed to more 
costly sources of funds (non-deposit liabilities) as opposed to the cheaper deposit sources.  As 
such, this liquidity-enhancing option, while favorable to bank liquidity conditions, is actually 
unfavorable in terms of enhancing profit potentials and, hence, maximizing equity gains for the 
bank.  Thus, this variable is expected to be positively related to the probability of bank failure. In 
this study, this variable’s coefficients across all time period models have been insignificant.   
The other liquidity measurement, LIQM2, calculated as the loan-to-deposit ratio, produced 
more significant results for the 6-month and 12-month models. The loan-to-deposit ratio captures 
the bank’s financing strategy where bank loans are funded through deposits – which is an ideal, 
logical operating decision for banks. An upswing in this ratio may suggest that a bank has less of 
a cushion to fund its growth and to protect itself against a sudden recall of its funding (Feldman 
1998). Thus, it should be positively related to the bank failure. The unexpected result for this 
variable (significantly negative) may indicate that this variable is a poor proxy of liquidity.   
The significant negative coefficients of PROFIT in all time period models (except for the 6-
month  and  18-month  models)  indicate  that  the  erosion  of  bank  profits  can  be  a  strong 
determinant (and eventual predictor) of the  probability of bank failure.  
PURCHASEDTL, defined as the percentage of purchased liabilities among total liabilities, 
captures  the  national  market  option  for  sourcing  funds.  As  described  by  Belongia  and 
Gilbert(Belongia and Gilbert, 1990), the liabilities purchased from national market will have 
higher interest rate. The coefficient results are robust across all time period models (except for 
the18 month-model) with significant positive results, indicating that banks are more likely to fail 
when exposed to the higher interest rate risk. On the other hand, the coefficient for DEPLIAB is negative  and  significant  in  all  time  period  models.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the 
expectation that banks’ tendency to thrive in their businesses are enhanced by their ability to 
maximize the generation of deposits to fund their business funding requirements.  
A third measure,  duration GAP measurement, is  also  included in the analysis to  further 
investigate interest  rate  risk issues. The  significant  positive  coefficient  of  GAP  that all time 
period  models  produced  is  consistent  with  logical  expectations  as  higher  GAP  values  are 
associated with higher interest rate risk. These results therefore imply that the probability of bank 
failure is positively related to the likelihood or incidence of higher interest rate risk or the banks’ 
greater sensitivity to interest rate change.  
The SIZE variable was at least significantly negatively related to the probability of failure in 
the 12-month model, while remaining insignificant in the other time period models. This results 
confirmed the “too big to fail” doctrine that larger banks could have already established more 
coping mechanisms that could be relied on in times of financial distress. 
Percentage  change  of  state-level  unemployment  rate  (UNEMRATE)  is  expected  to  be 
positively related to the probability of bank failure for a healthy economic condition should have 
a positive effect on the banking industry. However, it has mixed signs, which is not a new result. 
Thomson (1991), in his study, also obtained the same result suggesting a negative relationship 
between bank failure and unemployment rate.  He explained his results by citing the increased 
political constraints as explanation. The state-level bankruptcy filing ratio (BF) variable is more 
logically acceptable. The negative and significant coefficients imply that a higher incidence of 
business or non-business failures or bankruptcies in each state would further depress the general 
economic conditions that would, in turn, influence the surge of bank failures.  
In-Sample Classification Accuracy Table 4 reports the overall classification accuracy for all time period models, along with 
each  model’s  type  I  and  type  II  error,  and  Pseudo  R
2.  As  shown  in  table  3,  the  overall 
classification accuracy ranges from 95.11 to 98.59, where the accuracy level is highest for time 
period models are closer to the occurrence of bank failure.  The overall accuracy level tends to 
diminish as the time period model moves farther away from the experience of bank failure.  
Specifically, the accuracy rate is 98.59% for the more current 6-month time period model and 
95.11% for the 48-month period model.   
In a similar fashion, Pseudo R
2 also decreases as the time period model moves farther away 
from the time of bank failure. The same trend is not observed in the type I and type II error rates.  
These rates are calculated as percentages of misclassified observations to the total classifications 
in a certain category (failure versus non-failure). The range for Type I error is from 10.53% in 
the 6-month time period model to 56.32% in the 48-month time period model.  
Type II error rates are considerably smaller, ranging from 0.68% for the 6-month time period 
model to 1.19% for the 18-month model. 
Out-of-Sample Forecasting 
The forecasting efficiency or prediction accuracy of this study’s regression results is further 
tested through out-of-sample forecasting techniques. A separate dataset, consisting of banks that 
failed in 2010 and 1109 non-failed banks, is compiled for this analysis. The dataset is constructed 
in the same way that the cross-sectional datasets for the earlier regression were developed.   
The estimated coefficients from the previous cross-sectional logistic regression models are 
used for forecasting or prediction purposes (table 2). As before in the in-sample prediction, the 
cutoff  point  is  set  at  0.5  for  separating  failed  and  non-failed  banks.  The  out-of-sample 
classification accuracy ranges from 99.42 to 95.28 (table 4), reflecting an increasing trend in accuracy  rates  as  the  time  period  models  approach  the  point  of  bank  failure  (except  for  36 
months model, for which the classification error is less  than the 24 months). The 48-month 
model produced the highest rate of type I error (54.08 percent). In contrast, forecasts for the 6-
month to 36-month models produced type I error rates that range from 6.93 percent to 41.58 
percent. 
  As before, the type II error rates are much lower than the type I error rates. The range of 
values for type II error rates are from 0.45% in the 6-month model to 1.53% in the 36-month 
model.   
CONCLUSION 
In order to address the perennial question of whether the riskier, more volatile agricultural 
sector indeed has contributed significantly in causing and provoking the current crises in the 
financial industry, this study has developed early warning models that involve a host of potential 
determinants of the probability of bank failure. These factors include a set of variables that 
represent bank’s management decisions, operating strategies, financial conditions and prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions. The bank failure prediction models produced results that identified 
important early warning signals that could be detected as far back as 3 to 4 years prior to a 
bank’s declaration of insolvency or bankruptcy.  The most compelling result in the analyses of 
early  warning  signals  is  the  notable  insignificance  of  any  measure  related  to  the  banks’ 
agricultural loan portfolios. Even agricultural real and non-real estate loan delinquencies have 
not  been  established  to  significantly  influence  the  likelihood  of  bank  failure  across  all  time 
period models. These results confirm our contention that exposure to a seemingly riskier and 
more uncertain agribusiness operations does not necessarily enhance a banks’ tendency to fail. 
On the other hand, delinquency rates for consumer loans and commercial & industrial loans are significant  predictors  of  bank  failure.  As  commercial/industrial  loans  are  typically  larger  in 
magnitude, increases in delinquency in this loan category due to depressed economic demand 
and diminished economic activity will certainly help lead to bank failure.   
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6-month model  1
st Qtr 2009  3
rd Qtr 2008  2
nd Qtr 2009
7 
12-month model  3
rd Qtr 2008  1
st Qtr 2007  4
th Qtr 2008 
18-month model  1
st Qtr 2008  3
rd Qtr 2007  2
nd Qtr 2008 
24-month model  3
rd Qtr 2007  1
st Qtr 2007  4
th Qtr 2007 
36-month model  3
rd Qtr 2006  1
st Qtr 2006  4
th Qtr 2006 
48 month model  3
rd Qtr 2005  1
st Qtr 2005  4




   
                                                        
7 Data for surviving banks are determined using the entire coverage of the dataset.  The banking dataset used in this 
research extends to the last quarter of 2009.  Hence, a surviving bank’s data for the 6-month model, for instance, will 
be its 2
nd quarter of 2009 financial conditions.  Table 2. Cross-sectional logit regression results for bank failure prediction model 
Variables  Months to failure after Call Report issued 
6months  12months  18months  24months  36months  48months 








































































































































































































































































Note:  Table 1 Cross-sectional logit regression results for bank failure prediction model 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
 
 Table 2 Marginal effects of the logit results 
Table 3. Marginal Effects of the Logit Results 
Variables  Months to failure after Call Report issued 
6months  12months  18months  24months  36months  48months 





























































































































































































































































*** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
esults Table 4. In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Forecasting Results 
Forecasting Type 
Months prior to failure 
6months  12months  18months  24months  36months  48months 
A.  In-Sample Forecasting 
Classification accuracy 
(%) 
98.59  97.57  96.16  95.21  96.30  95.11 
Type I error (%)  10.53  22.11  36.84  44.68  41.11  56.32 
Type II error (%)  0.68  0.85  1.19  1.61  0.85  1.10 
Pseudo R
2  0.8699  0.7369  0.5878  0.5418  0.5501  0.4756 
B.  Out-of-Sample Forecasting 
Classification accuracy 
(%) 
99.42  97.44  95.45  95.29  95.95  95.28 
Type I error (%)  6.93  17.82  38.61  41.58  32.00  54.08 
Type II error (%)  0.45  1.17  1.44  1.35  1.53  1.08 
 
 